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RF DELAWARE, INC. V. PACIFIC KEYSTONE
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.:
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS FINALLY SPOKEN
ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OF CLAIM
INTERPRETATION
Rachel Clark Hugheyt
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Markman,' courts have
struggled to determine whether one court's claim interpretation is
binding on another court, and the decisions have not been uniform.
Some courts have held that claim interpretation has a special finality
and collateral estoppel always applies to an earlier claim
interpretation,2 and others have held it does not.3 As scholars debated
the issue,4 the Federal Circuit appeared content to remain silent. In
t Associate, Merchant & Gould, Minneapolis, MN; Adjunct Professor, University of
Minnesota Law School; J.D. University of Minnesota Law School, magna cum laude, Order of
the Coif, 2003; B.S. ChE University of Wisconsin - Madison, Tau Beta Pi, 2000. The views
expressed herein are strictly the present views of the author and do not reflect the views of her
firm or its clients.
I. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding that a district
court judge must, as a matter of law, construe the scope of a patent by interpreting the meaning
of the claims).
2. For cases holding that collateral estoppel applied to claim interpretation, see Edberg
v. CPI-The Alternative Supplier, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 190, 195-96 (D. Conn. 2001); Abbott
Labs. v. Dey L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667, 671-72 (N.D. I11. 2000); TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM
Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 376-77, 379 (S.D. N.Y. 1999); Sec. People, Inc. v. Medeco Sec.
Locks, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1041, 1044-45 (N.D. Cal. 1999), affd mem., 243 F.3d 555
(Fed. Cir. 2000); see also KX Indus., L.P. v. PUR Water Purification Prods., Inc., 108 F. Supp.
2d 380, 387 (D. Del. 2000).
3. For cases holding that collateral estoppel did not apply to the claim interpretation, see
Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469-70 (W.D. Va. 2001);
Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Int'l, LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663-65 (E.D. Pa. 1999);
P.A.T., Co. v. Ultrak, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1518, 1521 (D. Kan. 1996); see also Texas Instruments,
Inc. v. Linear Tech. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 580, 589 (E.D. Tex. 2002); Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc.,
80 F. Supp. 2d 921, 924 n.4 (N.D. 11.), modified, 130 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. I11. 2000).
4. See James P. Bradley & Kelly J. Kubasta, Issue Preclusion as Applied to Claim
Interpretation, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 323 (2002); Terril G. Lewis, Collateral Estoppel as
Applied to the Construction of Patent Claims (Part 11), 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 47
(2002); Terril G. Lewis, Collateral Estoppel as Applied to the Construction of Patent Claims
(Part 1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 851 (2001); C. Joel Van Over, Collateral
Estoppel and Markman Rulings: The Call For Uniformity, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1151 (2001);
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the case of RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Technologies, Inc.,
however, the Federal Circuit finally considered the issue.5
In RF Delaware, the Federal Circuit held that collateral estoppel
did not apply to the earlier claim constructions because the required
standard for finality was not met.6 The court held that the lower
court's orders granting partial summary judgment and the following
settlement were not sufficiently firm to have preclusive effect.7 With
its decision, the Federal Circuit clarified some of the questions that
the lower court decisions were unable to answer, although the RF
Delaware court never acknowledged either the growing circuit split
or its clarification of that split.
Part I of the Article provides an overview of patent law, claim
interpretation, collateral estoppel, and examines pre- and post-
Markman decisions on collateral estoppel, focusing especially on the
"essential to final judgment" element. Part II examines the Federal
Circuit's decision in RF Delaware. Part III analyzes the Federal
Circuit's decision and suggests how the decision affects the law of
collateral estoppel of claim interpretation. This Article concludes that
collateral estoppel can apply to a court's claim interpretation, but
there is no special finality to a claim interpretation, and the form of
the court's Markman hearing may affect whether collateral estoppel
can apply to the claim interpretation.
I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND CLAIM INTERPRETATION
A. Overview of Patent Law
A patent is essentially an agreement between an inventor and the
United States government. The government grants a patentee the right
to exclude others from "making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States" for a term of twenty years.8
In return for this right, the patentee must fully disclose the invention
to the public. 9 After the term of years of the patent runs out, the
Edward V. Filardi & Douglas R. Nemec, The Effect of Markman on Patent Litigation: Practical
Considerations, 714 PLI 225 (2002); Rachel Marie Clark, Note, Collateral Estoppel of Claim
Interpretation after Markman, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1581 (2002).
5. RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(decided Apr. 21, 2003).
6. Id. at 1261.
7. Id. at 1262.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
9. See id. § 154(a)(4).
2004] RF DELAWARE V. PACIFIC KEYSTONE TECH. 295
patent becomes a part of the public domain and anyone may use it.'0
The goal of the patent system is to encourage creativity and
innovation by providing an incentive to invent," and to allow other
inventors to utilize the information within the public domain.
12
An inventor may obtain a patent after successfully prosecuting a
patent application before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office.' 3 For a patent to be granted, the invention must meet certain
statutory requirements: it must be useful,' 4 novel,1
5 and nonobvious.16
The invention must also fall within the realm of patentable subject
matter.' 7  Once a patent application is filed, the patentee may file
further patent applications as continuations, continuations-in-part, or
divisional applications and claim the priority date of the original
application, as long as no new matter is introduced.'
8
If another party is allegedly using the invention without the
patentee's consent, the patentee may sue that party for infringement
of the patent. 19 The infringement analysis consists of two steps: (1)
construing the patent claims, and (2) determining whether the alleged
product infringes.20 Only the specifically described claims of a patent
may be infringed.2 '
Patent law is within the exclusive domain of the federal courts.22
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal
Circuit") has exclusive jurisdiction over patent case appeals from
23district courts, subject to discretionary review by the Supreme
Court.24 Congress created the Federal Circuit to assure consistency in
10. See, e.g., In re Robeson, 331 F.2d 610, 614 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
11. See, e.g., Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998).
12. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938).
13. See HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 13-26 (2d ed. 1995).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
15. Id. § 102.
16. Id. § 103.
17. Id. § 101.
18. 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2001).
19. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271 and 281 (2000).
20. See Strattec Sec. Corp. v. Gen. Auto. Specialty Co., 126 F.3d 1411, 1416 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
21. See, e.g., Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55
F.3d 615, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing creation of a national patent system and
empowering Congress to "promote the progress of science and useful arts" by "securing for
limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive right to their respective ... discoveries"); 35 U.S.C.
§§ 1-376 (2000).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2000).
24. Id. § 1254.
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patent decisions and to decrease the workload of the circuit courts.
25
The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over interlocutory orders for
which it would have jurisdiction originally, 26 orders involving a
controlling question of law for which there is a substantial ground for
a difference of opinion, 27 and judgments that are final except for the
damages calculation.28 To assure consistency, district courts are
required to follow Federal Circuit precedent on substantive issues in
patent cases.29
B. Overview of Claim Interpretation
Until 1996, courts were not uniform in deciding whether
interpretation of a patent claim (also called claim interpretation or
claim construction) was an issue of fact for the jury to decide, or an
issue of law for the court to decide. 30  In 1996, the Supreme Court
decided Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., and held that as a
matter of law a district court judge must interpret the meaning of
patent claims. 3' The Court suggested that collateral estoppe 32 would
provide for uniformity in jury decisions, and concluded that "treating
interpretive issues as purely legal will promote (though it will not
guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of
stare decisis on those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional
uniformity under the authority of the single appeals court." 33  Since
the Markman decision, courts have clarified that the Federal Circuit's
25. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20-24 (1981); S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981).
26. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c), (d) (2000).
27. Id. § 1292(b), (c)(1).
28. Id. § 1292(c)(2).
29. See Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
30. For cases holding that the interpretation of patent claim language is an issue of fact,
see Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft, m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1550
(Fed. Cir. 1991); Perini Am., Inc. v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 832 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir.
1987); H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1987). For
cases holding that interpretation of patent claim language is an issue of law, see Read Corp. v.
Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822-23 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952
F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561-63
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
31. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
32. Collateral estoppel is "an affirmative defense barring a party from relitigating an issue
determined against that party in an earlier action, even if the second action differs significantly
from the first one." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 256 (7th ed. 1999).
33. Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.
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claim interpretation of a patent is binding on district courts. 34 If all of
the elements of collateral estoppel are met, a district court's claim
interpretation may also be binding on another district court.
35
Judges can interpret the language of a patent anytime during a
trial,36 and since the Markman decision, many courts now have a
hearing before or during the trial in which the court interprets the
claim language (called a Markman trial or a Markman hearing).37 A
district court's claim interpretation is an interlocutory decision, 38 and
critics argue that after claim interpretation, the courts should allow
parties to appeal the claim interpretation to the Federal Circuit in an
interlocutory appeal,39 rather than waiting for appeal after the trial.4 °
The Federal Circuit, however, has consistently refused to grant
interlocutory appeals for claim interpretation4 '-instead reviewing
claim interpretation de novo,42 and overruling forty percent of the
34. See Wang Labs., Inc. v. Oki Elec. Indus. Co., 15 F. Supp. 2d 166, 175 (D. Mass.
1998); Moore N. Am., Inc., v. Adams Inv. Co., No. 4-99-CV-90376, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20958, at *23 (S.D. Iowa July 27, 2000).
35. The application of collateral estoppel to a district court's claim interpretation will be
discussed in great depth in this Article. See infra Parts I and III.
36. The American Bar Association reported that in 1999, 7.8% of the time, claim
construction proceedings were conducted before discovery; 21.9% were during discovery;
57.8% were after the close of discovery, but before trial; and "12.5% of the reported claim
construction proceedings were during trial; half before closing argument and half after."
Edward V. Filardi & Meir Y. Blonder, How to Prepare & Conduct Markman Hearings, 665 PLI
237, 247 (2001).
37. See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572,
1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
38. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(Newman, J., additional views); Vivid Techs. Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 93,
95 (D. Mass. 1997), aff'd, 200 F.3d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), (c)(1) (2000).
40. See Craig Allen Nard, Symposium, Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next
Century: Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv.
355; Frank M. Gasparo, Comment, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and its Procedural
Shock Wave: The Markman Hearing, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 723, 766-67 (1997).
41. See, e.g., Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1479 (Newman, J., additional views); Flores v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., No. Misc. 474, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 31117, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 1996)
(unpublished); Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469 (W.D. Va.
2001); Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 375, 377 (D. Del. 1999), aff'd in part, 222
F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Peter J. Ayers, Armed and Ready: Defeating Patent
Infringement Claims by Summary Judgment, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 421, 448
n.168 (1999) (noting that the Federal Circuit has not accepted an interlocutory appeal from a
Markman hearing). Note that in the Kollmorgen case, the Federal Circuit granted an
interlocutory appeal on the issue of collateral estoppel of claim interpretation, but it was never
decided. Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 21 Fed.Appx. 893 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see
also infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
42. In re Asahi/Am. Inc., 68 F.3d 442, 444 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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claim constructions it hears.43 Some critics suggest that Markman did
not meet its goal of uniformity; others applaud the Markman decision,
arguing it will bring greater uniformity to patent claim
interpretation. 4
C. Overview of Collateral Estoppel
Some decisions have a preclusive effect on later judgments.
Issue preclusion,45 or collateral estoppel, bars relitigation of issues
that were actually and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding
by a valid and final judgment if the determination was essential to the
judgment.46 Collateral estoppel does not need to be mutual and, thus,
parties who were not involved in the original action can assert the
defense. 7 While any party may raise the defense, it can be held
against only those who were parties (or in privity with parties) in the
48earlier proceeding. The party asserting the defense must prove that
(1) the issue is identical to the issue decided in the prior action, (2) the
issue was litigated in the prior action, (3) the party against whom
collateral estoppel is sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in the prior action, and (4) the determination was essential to
the final judgment of the prior action.49 Collateral estoppel is a
43. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1476 & n.4 (Rader, J., dissenting) (noting that one study shows a
forty percent reversal rate, considering a survey of every case decided by the Federal Circuit
between April 5, 1995, and November 24, 1997); see also William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still
Adjusting to Markman: A Prescription for the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 55, 67 (1999) ("Although, according to the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court, Markman should have ushered in greater uniformity, predictability, and certainty in
patent litigation, many believe that the holding has had the opposite effect. This is largely
because Federal Circuit review of claim interpretation is de novo").
44. See Sue Ann Mota, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.: Patent Construction is
Within the Exclusive Province of the Court Under the Seventh Amendment, 3 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
3, 28 (1997) ("The Markman decision will grant uniformity and expediency in patent claim
interpretations and will force inventors to write patent claims clearly to exactly describe the
invention."), at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt//v3il/mota.html.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. b (1982).
46. See In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 132.01[2] (3d ed. 1997). In contrast to collateral estoppel, claim preclusion (also
called res judicata) prevents the same parties from relitigating claims that were not raised in the
original litigation if the claims arose from the same transaction or occurrence. See id. at
131.10[l], 131.12[4][a]-[b].
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982); see also 6 DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.0212][f][ii] (2003).
48. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1980); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
49. Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 260 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing In re
Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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procedural issue, and thus, the law of the regional circuit court
applies.50 Most circuits use the basic four-part test, or a similar
variation.5l Collateral estoppel can apply to issues that arise in patent
cases, such as determinations of infringement.
5 2
D. Collateral Estoppel when the Prior Action Ended in
Summary Judgment
Collateral estoppel may be asserted even if the previous
litigation ended with a grant of summary judgment.5 3 The denial of
summary judgment or grant of partial summary judgment, however,
generally does not have collateral estoppel effect.5 4 For example, in
the pre-Markman case of Syntex Pharmaceuticals International, Ltd.
v. K-Line Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., the Federal Circuit held that an order
granting summary judgment of infringement of a patent and denying
the alleged infringer's motion for summary judgment of invalidity did
not present a final judgment from which an appeal could be taken
because the case was not fully adjudicated as to all claims for all
parties and there was no certification order.55 After Marklnan, courts
50. See Epic Metals Corp. v. H.H. Robertson Co., 870 F.2d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
8 CHISUM, supra note 47, § 21.02[5][b][iv][D].
51. Clark, supra note 4, at 1592 & n.69.
52. See Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(affirming application of collateral estoppel to judgment of patent invalidity and
unenforceability).
53. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Trilogy Communications, Inc. v. Times Fiber
Communications, Inc., 109 F.3d 739, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that a summary judgment
certified as final under Rule 54(b) is a final judgment); Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713
F.2d 705, 712 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that a patent's validity was fully and fairly litigated
even though it was based on a motion for summary judgment); see also Nat'l Satellite Sports,
Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 910 (6th Cir. 2001); Matosantos Commercial Corp. v.
Applebee's Int'l, Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001); Steen v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 106 F.3d 904, 912 (9th Cir. 1997).
54. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.H., 55 F.3d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995)
(refusing to give partial summary judgment preclusive effect); Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v.
Insured Lloyd's, 786 F.2d 1265, 1272 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding "an order granting partial
summary judgment 'has no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect"') (quoting Golman v.
Tesoro Drilling Corp., 700 F.2d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 1983)); Del Mar Avionics v. Quinton
Instruments Co., 645 F.2d 832, 834 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that a grant of partial summary
judgment is not appealable as a final order, but in patent cases, appellate jurisdiction is available
that allows appeals from judgments in patent infringement actions that are final except for the
damages calculation); Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 689, 707-08
(S.D. Tex. 1993) (describing a partial summary judgment order as "unappealable" because the
parties settled after judgment); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fairchild, 620 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (D.
Idaho 1985) (holding that a partial summary judgment order was not issue preclusive),
rescinded on other grounds, 624 F. Supp. 567, 568 (D. Idaho 1986).
55. Syntex Pharms. Int'l Ltd. v. K-Line Pharms., 905 F.2d 1525, 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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continue to hold that collateral estoppel applies to determinations on
infringement even though the earlier proceeding ended with summary
judgment.56
E. Collateral Estoppel of Claim Interpretation
From the pre- and post-Markman cases on collateral estoppel, it
is not clear when collateral estoppel applies to a court's claim
interpretation. Prior to the Markman decision, Federal Circuit
precedent indicated that collateral estoppel could apply to
determinations of infringement and validity as well as claim
interpretations if the required prongs of the collateral estoppel test
were met.57 Only a few district court decisions have dealt with the
subject of collateral estoppel of claim interpretation since the
Markman case, and these decisions are not uniform.58 Although the
Federal Circuit has suggested that collateral estoppel can apply to
claim interpretation, 59 it has not clarified the growing split among the
district courts. Clearly if the same patent claim language is at issue in
the lawsuits, the issue is identical and the first factor of the collateral
estoppel test is satisfied.60  If the court interpreted claim language and
both parties presented arguments, the second prong of "actually
56. See, e.g. Sec. People, Inc. v. Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal.
1999), aff'dmem., 243 F.3d 555 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
57. See Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 5 F.3d 514, 518 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The prior claim
interpretation has issue preclusive effect in the present case insofar as it was necessary to the
judgment of noninfringement in the previous case."); Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp.,
747 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that collateral estoppel did not apply to claim
interpretation because the claim interpretation was not the reason for the loss in the first case);
Molinaro v. Fannon/Courier Corp., 745 F.2d 651, 655 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("Where a determination
of the scope of patent claims was made in a prior case, and the determination was essential to
the judgment there on the issue of infringement, there is collateral estoppel in a later case on the
scope of such claims .... ); A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(holding that in order to apply collateral estoppel to the claim interpretation, the interpretation
must have been essential to the final judgment); see also Clark, supra note 4, at 1612, 1625-26.
58. For cases holding that collateral estoppel did not apply to claim interpretation, see
Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469-70 (W.D. Va. 2001) and
Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Int'l, LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664-65 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
For cases holding that collateral estoppel applies to claim interpretation, see cases cited supra
note 2.
59. See Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(suggesting that when the first action is concerned with a dispute over a particular claim term,
the court's construction of the claim terms not in dispute is "merely dictum, and therefore has no
issue preclusive effect").
60. See, e.g., Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 31, 35
(S.D. N.Y. 2003); see also Clark, supra note 4, at 1594-95; see generally Van Over, supra note
4, at 1161-65.
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litigated" is satisfied.6' When the court interprets the claim, and both
sides litigate the issue, it is clear the third prong of "full and fair
opportunity to litigate" is met.62 The fourth requirement, that the
determination of the issue be essential to the final judgment of the
previous litigation, is the prong that the courts debate.
The party asserting collateral estoppel must prove that the
determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment of the
previous litigation.63  For this prong to be met, a final judgment is
required; if a final judgment is issued, it is necessary that the
64determination in the prior action be essential to that judgment.
When the court interprets the claim language, the patentee loses on
infringement, and the court issues a final judgment, the fourth factor
is met.65  However, it is not always clear which types of resolution
actually produce a final judgment.
Courts are often asked to decide whether determinations prior to
settlements or consent judgments should be given collateral estoppel
effect. 6 6 Generally, collateral estoppel does not apply to the decisions
without a final judgment on the merits unless it is clear the parties so
intend.67 Settlements are usually meant to end litigation only on the
61. Clark, supra note 4, at 1597-98; see also Van Over, supra note 4, at 1165-66.
62. Clark, supra note 4, at 1598.
63. See Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 260 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing In
re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
64. Id. For a discussion of whether a judgment is essential to a final judgment, see Clark,
supra note 4, at 1610-13, 1624-28. Note that if a judgment is based on one of several
alternative findings, a claim interpretation that is essential to one of those findings will not be
given preclusive effect because it does not meet the "essential to final judgment" requirement.
See, e.g., Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1329-31 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that
collateral estoppel did not apply to the claim interpretation when there were alternative findings,
any one of which would have been sufficient to support the judgment of noninfringement,
because the claim interpretation was not essential to final judgment) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. o); Jean F. Rydstrom, Collateral Estoppel Effect, in
Federal Court, of Judgment Resting on Independent Grounds, 29 A.L.R. FED. 764-65 (1976);
see generally Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Int'l, LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664-65
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that collateral estoppel did not apply to a claim interpretation because
the party that lost on claim interpretation won on infringement).
65. See Abbott Labs. v. Dey L.P., 10 F. Supp. 2d 667, 670-71 (N.D. Il. 2000).
66. See 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 30.70, 30.73 (2003).
67. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) ("[Sjettlements ordinarily
occasion no issue preclusion.., unless it is clear... that the parties intend their agreement to
have such an effect."); Foster v. Hallco Manufacturing Co., 947 F.2d 469, 480-81 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (holding that collateral estoppel does not usually arise from a consent judgment, but
noting that the issue of patent validity could be precluded if the parties to the consent judgment
stipulate their intention to preclude challenges to the validity of that patent). See also Mayer v.
Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375, 1379 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[S]ettlement agreements not approved by a court
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claim presented, not necessarily the issue; thus, although claim
preclusion may be appropriate, collateral estoppel (or issue
preclusion) generally is not.68
Most courts do not require absolute finality for a determination
to have preclusive effect. With some exceptions, the courts instead
ask if the judgment is sufficiently firm to be accorded preclusive
effect. 69  An interlocutory order, such as a claim interpretation, "is
are not given preclusive effect."); Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575
F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding collateral estoppel does not apply to a settlement without
a final judgment on the merits); Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Mortis, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1067-68 (D. Minn. 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e (1980).
But see In re Halpem, 810 F.2d 1061, 1064-66 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (holding that issue preclusion
based on state court consent judgment was proper, where parties intended consent judgment to
operate as final adjudication of factual issues contained in consent judgment, factual findings in
consent judgment were sufficiently detailed to leave little doubt as to their meaning, debtor had
received consideration in exchange for agreeing that consent judgment would constitute final
adjudication of the findings, there was no evidence of coercion or duress, and consent judgment
was signed by both debtor and his attorney); Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1296 (7th
Cir. 1987) (holding stipulation entered by debtor as part of consent decree satisfied actual
litigation requirement of collateral estoppel).
68. See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4443,
at 384-85 (1981) ("In most circumstances, it is recognized that consent agreements ordinarily
are intended to preclude any further litigation on the claim presented but are not intended to
preclude further litigation on any of the issues presented. Thus, consent judgments ordinarily
support claim preclusion but not issue preclusion."); ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 661 (5th ed. 2001); see also Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. at 414 (noting
consent judgments apply to claim preclusion, not issue preclusion); United States v. Int'l Bldg.
Co., 345 U.S. 502, 505 (1953); Aaron Basha Corp. v. Felix B. Vollman, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d
226, 229-30 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) (refusing to apply collateral estoppel to a preliminary injunction
when the parties settled prior to trial).
69. See, e.g., Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 366 (2nd Cir. 1992) (quoting
Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 955 (2nd Cir. 1964));
Dyndul v. Dyndul, 620 F.2d 409, 412 & n.8 (3rd Cir. 1980) (quoting Lummus Co. v.
Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2nd Cir. 1961)); see also John Morrell & Co. v.
Local Union 304A of the United Food & Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 563-64 (8th Cir.
1990) (holding that the verdict at the liability phase of the trial had preclusive effect even it was
not immediately appealable because the damages phase of the trial had not concluded); Miller
Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that an
interlocutory appeal from a preliminary injunction "will be given preclusive effect if it is
necessarily based upon a determination that constitutes an insuperable obstacle to the plaintiff's
success on the merits"); United Bus. Communications, Inc. v. Racal-Milgo, Inc., 591 F. Supp.
1172, 1184-85 (D. Kan. 1984) (holding that the prior decision of patent invalidity was "final"
for collateral estoppel purposes when the findings were final in all respects except for the entry
of judgment); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1213 (S.D. N.Y. 1981)
(holding that the determination of the issues by the jury that were subsequently affirmed by the
federal appellate court satisfied the finality requirement of issue preclusion); 18 MOORE et al.,
supra note 46, 132.03[5][b][i] ("Issue preclusion, however, unlike appealability under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, does not require a judgment that ends the litigation and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment.").
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subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment., 70 Most
courts hold that interlocutory orders should not be given preclusive
effect because they are tentative.71 Courts both before and after
Markman have held that in order for collateral estoppel to apply, there
must have been a final judgment on infringement or validity.72  It is
not clear what a settlement does to affect the element of finality of a
court's claim interpretation. When parties settle after a final
judgment, the necessary elements of collateral estoppel are met.73
There are several cases on the issue of when the parties settle after the
claim interpretation but prior to trial, and the decisions are not
uniform.7 4
In the first post-Markman case to consider the issue, TMPatents,
L.P. v. IBM Corp., the Southern District of New York held that
collateral estoppel applies to an earlier claim interpretation even if the
case is settled prior to trial. 75 The court determined that although the
parties in the earlier proceeding settled the dispute and there was no
final, appealable judgment, finality for collateral estoppel purposes
was met.76 The court rejected pre-Markman precedent on collateral
estoppel, 77 and relied on several decisions for the proposition that
Some courts do require absolute finality for collateral estoppel to apply, though. See, e.g., Beck
v. Levering, 947 F.2d 639, 642 (2nd Cir. 1991); Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Insured Lloyd's,
786 F.2d 1265, 1269 (5th Cir. 1986); Gresham Park Cmty. Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1242
(5th Cir. 1981); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 794 F. Supp. 1015, 1024 (D. Mont. 1991),
aff'd, 962 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1992). Although the fifth circuit appears to require absolute
finality, that circuit has held that a verdict rendered by a jury, even though judgment has not
been entered, is sufficiently final. Recoveredge L.P. v. Pentecost, 44 F.3d 1284, 1295 (5th Cir.
1995).
70. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); also see generally Total Containment Inc. v. Environ Prods.
Inc., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1316, 1316 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("So long as [a] district court has jurisdiction
over [a] case, it possesses inherent power over interlocutory orders, and can reconsider them
when it is consonant with justice to do so.") (quoting United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 605
(3rd Cir. 1973)).
71. Clark, supra note 4, at 1600-02 & nn. 106-12.
72. Id. at 1602 & n.112.
73. Id. at 1607-08.
74. See Edberg v. CPI-The Alternative Supplier, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Conn.
2001) and TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D. N.Y. 1999). Both cases
held collateral estoppel applied to the earlier claim interpretation even though there was no final
judgment on infringement or validity. But see Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147
F. Supp. 2d 464, 469-70 (W.D. Va. 2001) (holding collateral estoppel did not apply to the
earlier claim interpretation because there was no final judgment on infringement or validity).
75. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d 370. For a more detailed discussion of the case, see
Clark, supra note 4, at 1604-05, and Bradley & Kubasta, supra note 4, at 338-39.
76. See TMPatents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375-76.
77. See id. at 378 ("Cases such as Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser American Corp., 747
F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984); A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
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finality is a stage in the litigation in which an issue "'has reached such
a stage that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it to be
litigated again.' ' 78  The TM Patents court held that finality for
purposes of collateral estoppel depends on the nature of the decision,
the adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for review. 79 In
Edberg v. CPI-The Alternative Supplier, Inc., the District Court of
Connecticut chose to follow TM Patents and held that the plaintiff
was estopped from relitigating the claim construction, even though
the prior suit was settled before the determination of infringement. 80
The court noted, "the mere fact that plaintiffs settled the prior case
does not give this Court's prior rulings any less preclusive effect."
81
In the most recent case on the issue, Kollmorgen Corp. v.
Yaskawa Electric Corp., the Western District of Virginia held that
collateral estoppel does not apply to claim interpretation if the case is
settled before trial. 82 The Kollmorgen court rejected the reasoning in
TM Patents and did not mention the Edberg decision, as Kollmorgen
was decided less than a month after Edberg.83 The court, following
pre-Markman Federal Circuit precedent, held that a consensual
settlement prior to a final judgment between the parties did not
constitute a "final judgment," the claim interpretation was not
essential to the "non-existent final judgment," and collateral estoppel
did not apply. 84 The Kollmorgen court held that a ruling is final for
collateral estoppel purposes if the ruling is essential to the final
judgment on infringement or validity. 85 On appeal of the Kollmorgen
case, the Federal Circuit-recognizing, in light of TM Patents that
there was a substantial difference in opinion "whether a patentee who
settles an earlier infringement case after a Markman ruling is
precluded under the doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating
claim construction issues determined in the prior case"-granted an
and Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1980)-are
inapplicable in the post-Markman era, at least when the district court holds a special pre-trial
hearing...").
78. Id. at 376.
79. Id.
80. Clark, supra note 4, at 1605-06 & n.124 (citing Edberg v. CPI-The Alternative
Supplier, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 190, 195-96 (D. Conn. 2001)).
81. Edberg, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
82. Clark, supra note 4, at 1606 & n.126 (citing Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec.
Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 470 (W.D. Va. 2001)). For a detailed discussion of the case, see
also Bradley & Kubasta, supra note 4, at 340-42.
83. See Kollmorgen, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
84. Id. at 469-70.
85. Id. at 469.
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interlocutory appeal, but the issue was never actually decided by the
court.8 6
Thus, although pre-Markman precedent indicates that issues such
as a court's claim interpretation decided before settlement do not
generally have collateral estoppel effect, post-Markman cases do not
necessarily agree. In TM Patents and Edberg, the courts applied
collateral estoppel to the claim interpretations even though the parties
settled before the trial.87 In Kollmorgen, however, the court rejected
TMPatents and refused to apply collateral estoppel. 88 Some scholars
agree with the result in TMPatents,89 and others do not.90
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN RF DELAWARE, INC. V.
PACIFIC KEYSTONE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
In the case of RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone
Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit finally had the chance to
address the issue of collateral estoppel of claim interpretation. 91 In
RF Delaware, the patentee, RF Delaware, Inc. ("RFD") owned two
patents (the '630 patent and the '124 patent) relating to the use and
washing of an upflow filter in combination with upflow and
downflow water filtration systems.92 The patents cover the same
subject matter and have identical written descriptions. 93
86. See Kollmorgen Corp. v. Vaskawa Elec. Corp., 21 Fed.Appx. 893 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
87. See supra notes 75-81.
88. See supra notes 82-85.
89. See, e.g., Nard, supra note 40, at 384 ("Judge McMahon [of TM Patents] understands,
correctly in my opinion; that a Markman hearing is procedurally unique and calls into question
case law and procedural rules that were in place prior to Markman."); Van Over, supra note 4, at
1152 ("As this Article argues, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit's sister circuits would
seem to favor the application of collateral estoppel to Markman rulings, at least under the
circumstances of both TMPatents and Graco.").
90. See, e.g., Bradley & Kubasta, supra note 4, at 341 ("As an initial matter, the authors
believe that the more flexible approach encouraged by the Kollmorgen and the Graco decisions
is more appropriate than the rigid approach of TM Patents."); Filardi & Nemec, supra note 4, at
262 ("While the rationale [in TM Patents] seems sound it does not recognize that an established
exception to collateral estoppel in a subsequent action with another defendant, is where 'the
issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined would inappropriately foreclose
opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon which it was based."') (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 29(7) (1980)); Terril G. Lewis, Collateral Estoppel as
Applied to the Construction of Patent Claims (Part 1), 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
47, 66 (2002) ("The foundations of TM Patents' reasoning lends to easy criticism."); Clark,
supra note 4, at 1616 ("The TM Patents test for finality, however, is ambiguous and will not
lead to consistency in the application of collateral estoppel.").
91. 326 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
92. Id. at 1258.
93. Id.
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Prior to the suit between RFD and Pacific Keystone, the patents
were construed by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia in an action between RFD and Infilco Degremont,
Inc. ("IDI").94 In that case, RFD charged IDI with infringement of the
patents.95 RFD moved for summary judgment of literal infringement
and validity, and IDI moved for summary judgment of non-
infringement. 96 The Virginia district court construed the claims and
issued two interlocutory orders: (1) the court found no literal
infringement of the '630 patent, but recognized a genuine issue of
material tact with respect to infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, and thus denied RFD's motion for summary judgment of
literal infringement and granted-in-part and denied-in-part defendant
IDI's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement; and (2) the
court denied RFD's motion for summary judgment of literal
infringement of the '124 patent and granted RFD's motion for
summary judgment of validity of the first claim, but made no ruling
of non-infringement. 97 The case was ready for trial on the issue of
infringement when RFD and IDI settled.98 After the settlement, there
was no judgment or certification of a final order.99
Later, RFD sued Pacific Keystone Technologies, Inc. ("Pacific")
for infringement of the same patents in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama.100 The court avoided
addressing the TM Patents/Kollmorgen split, suggesting, "It is not
necessary for this court to determine whether the [Eastern District] of
Virginia case collaterally estops RFD. The court does note that its
decision is consistent with the holding of the Virginia case." 101 The
court construed the claims,10 2 and then granted Pacific's motions for
summary judgment, deciding that Pacific did not infringe either
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.10 3 RFD appealed. 104
94. Id. at 1259.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1261.
97. RF Delaware, 326 F.3d at 1261.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1262
100. Id. at 1259.
101. Id. at 1260 n.1 (quoting RFDelaware, CV-01-PT-0348-M, slip op. at 45 n.63).
102. Id. at 1259.
103. RF Delaware, 326 F.3d at 1260. The court also granted Pacific's motion for
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered Pacific's argument
that, regardless of the propriety of the Alabama court's interpretation
of the claim language, RFD was bound by the Virginia court's claim
interpretation.105 Specifically, the Federal Circuit decided whether the
district court "is bound by claim constructions in rulings on partial
summary judgment from.., a case involving the same patents that
ended in an extrajudicial settlement without complete adjudication
even as to liability.',
10 6
The court first recognized that collateral estoppel is a procedural
issue that is governed by regional circuit law, and thus applied
eleventh circuit law.'0 7 The court considered the basic four-prong test
for collateral estoppel, noting that for collateral estoppel to apply, the
party seeking to invoke it must prove that: (1) the issue is identical to
the issue decided in the prior action; (2) the issue was litigated in the
prior action; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is sought
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action;
and (4) the determination was essential to the final judgment of the
prior action.10 8 Applying eleventh circuit law, the court suggested
that "'if the parties to a suit enter into an extrajudicial settlement or
compromise, there is no judgment, and future litigation is not barred
by res judicata or collateral estoppel ... ,'109 The court, however,
also pointed out that "[f]or purposes of issue preclusion.. ., 'final
judgment' includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another
action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded
conclusive effect." 10 The court suggested that whether a decision is
"sufficiently firm" depends on whether the parties were "fully
heard.""' As an example, the court cited Christo, in which the
eleventh circuit held that a prior district court order issued after an
evidentiary hearing satisfied the finality standard, because the district
court notified the parties of possible preclusive effect, considered the
105. Seeid. at 1260-61.
106. Id. at 1260.
107. Id. at 1261.
108. Id. (citing In re McWhorter, 887 F.2d 1564, 1566 (1lth Cir. 1989)).
109. RF Delaware, 326 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g and
Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1978)). Although Kaspar is a fifth circuit case, the case
is binding on the eleventh circuit because it was decided in 1978 and is a predecessor to the
eleventh circuit. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 n.47 (11 th Cir. 2002) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 13 (1980)).
111. Id. (citing Christo, 223 F.3d at 1339 n.47).
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findings final, and entered a final order approving the proposed
settlement." 1
2
In RF Delaware, the Federal Circuit held that collateral estoppel
did not apply to the earlier claim constructions because the required
standard for finality was not met. 1 3 To meet that standard, an order
must be sufficiently firm to have preclusive effect. The court held that
the orders granting partial summary judgment and the following
settlement were not sufficiently firm to have preclusive effect." 14 The
court differentiated the Christo case, suggesting that the Virginia
court's determination was not similar to the situation in Christo."
15
The court suggested that the cases were different because in the
Virginia case, unlike in Christo, there was no evidence that an
evidentiary hearing was conducted to construe the claims, and that the
court did not allow the parties to engage in oral arguments on one of
the patents. 16 Because of this, the court suggested, the parties may
not have been "fully heard"." 7 The court also noted that, unlike in
Christo, in the Virginia case the parties were not notified that the
orders could have preclusive effect. 1 8 Finally, unlike in Christo, the
Virginia court did not enter a final order approving the proposed
settlement between the parties." 9  After construing the claim
language, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment. 20
III. ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S RFDELAWARE DECISION
AND ITS IMPACT ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OF CLAIM
INTERPRETATION
In RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Technologies, Inc., the
Federal Circuit held that collateral estoppel did not apply to an earlier
claim construction because the required standard for finality was not
met. 12  The court held that the orders granting partial summary
judgment and the following settlement in the previous action were not
112. Id. (citing Christo, 223 F.3d at 1339).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1261-62.





120. RF Delaware, 326 F.3d at 1268.
121. Id. at 1261.
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sufficiently firm to have preclusive effect. 122 Although the Federal
Circuit apparently clarified some of the issues surrounding collateral
estoppel of claim interpretation that both courts and scholars have
debated, the court neither acknowledged the debate specifically nor
any of the recent cases on the issue. Because the court did not
specifically address the debate, it is necessary to determine whether
the decision was correct and what impact the court's holding has on
the collateral estoppel of claim interpretation debate.
A. The RF Delaware Case Is Consistent with Pre- and Post-
Markman Precedent
In RF Delaware, the Federal Circuit held that collateral estoppel
did not apply to the claim interpretation because the orders granting
partial summary judgment were not sufficiently final. 2 3 In the prior
action, after the court granted-in-part and also denied the parties'
motions for summary judgment, the court still had to determine some
issues of infringement.' 24 Before the issues could be determined by
trial, the parties settled.
125
A denial of summary judgment or a grant-in-part and denial-in-
part of summary judgment usually does not have collateral estoppel
effect. 126 A long history of cases, both pre- and post-Markman, has
shown that a finding of partial summary judgment or a denial of
summary judgment is not sufficiently firm for collateral estoppel to
apply to a determination. 27  The RF Delaware court's holding is
consistent with the holdings of these courts on the issue.
B. Collateral Estoppel Can Apply to Claim Interpretation
Prior to Markman, both district courts and the Federal Circuit
held that collateral estoppel could apply to claim interpretation if all
of the elements were met. 128  After Markman, some courts have
suggested that a court's claim interpretation has a special finality for
122. Id. at 1262.
123. Id. Although most courts hold that interlocutory orders should not be given
preclusive effect because they are tentative, see supra note 71, the court does not address the
tentative nature of a denial of summary judgment or grant-in-part of summary judgment, stating
merely that the decisions are not sufficiently final for collateral estoppel to apply. RF Delaware,
326 F.3d at 1261-62.
124. RFDelaware, 326 F.3d at 1261.
125. Id.
126. See cases cited supra note 54.
127. See cases cited supra note 54.
128. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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collateral estoppel purposes, although other courts disagree.129 Lower
courts have held that if all of the elements are met, collateral estoppel
can apply to a court's claim interpretation. 130 Although several courts
have found collateral estoppel did not apply to an earlier claim
interpretation, each of those courts held it did not apply because a
specific prong of the test was not met.131 For example, one court
suggested that the finality prong was not met when the parties settled
after the claim interpretation but prior to trial. 32 No court has held
that collateral estoppel can never apply to claim interpretation.
Although the Federal Circuit held in the RF Delaware case that
collateral estoppel did not apply to the earlier claim interpretations, its
language suggests that collateral estoppel can apply to claim
interpretation if all of the necessary elements are met.' 33  RF
Delaware is the first post-Markman Federal Circuit decision on
collateral estoppel of claim interpretation,134 but lower courts have
already held that collateral estoppel can apply to claim
interpretation. 3 5 The court had the opportunity to state clearly and
definitively that collateral estoppel can apply to claim interpretation if
all of the elements are met, but it did not. Rather, it implied this
possibility through its analysis, which clearly indicates that collateral
estoppel can apply to a court's claim interpretation. The court stated,
"We conclude that collateral estoppel does not apply in the present
case because no judgment, much less final judgment, was ever
entered in the Virginia district court case."' 136 The court then outlined
the four-part test necessary for collateral estoppel to apply. 37  The
court never suggested that collateral estoppel cannot apply to claim
interpretation, and from its analysis it is clear that if the elements of
129. See Edberg v. CPI-The Alternative Supplier, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Conn.
2001); TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D. N.Y. 1999).
130. See supra notes 2-3, 75-86 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 2-3, 57, 75-86 and accompanying text.
132. Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469-70 (W.D. Va.
2001).
133. Because the court found that the level of finality was not met in the first action and
therefore collateral estoppel did not apply, it did not have occasion to comment on whether or
not the claim interpretation was "necessary", and thus the court did not suggest whether the
Graco case was decided correctly. See Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Int'l, LLC, 77 F.
Supp. 2d 660, 663 (E.D. Pa. 1999). Based on the discussion in III.B. and III.C., it appears that
the Graco decision is correct. For more discussion of the Graco decision, see Clark, supra note
4, at 1612-13, 1627-28.
134. RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
135. See supra notes 2-3, 75-86 and accompanying text.
136. RFDelaware, 326 F.3d at 1261.
137. Id.
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collateral estoppel are met, collateral estoppel can apply to a court's
earlier claim interpretation. The court's endorsement of the
application of collateral estoppel to claim interpretation is consistent
with both pre-Markman Federal Circuit decisions and post-Markman
district court decisions.1
38
Whether the necessary elements are met is a more difficult
question. Some scholars and courts, such as TM Patents and Edberg,
suggest that after Markman a court's claim interpretation has some
special finality to it.139 Others disagree.140 Whether the RF Delaware
court clarified the required standard for finality is discussed below.
C. The RF Delaware Court Did Not Explicitly Clarify the
Standard for Finality
Before the Markman decision, the Federal Circuit had held that
collateral estoppel could apply to claim interpretation if all of the
required elements were met.' 41 After Markman, some lower courts
have suggested that there is a special finality to a court's claim
interpretation for the purposes of collateral estoppel, but other courts
have disagreed. 142 Since the Markman decision, the Federal Circuit
has applied collateral estoppel to infringement and validity
determinations, 43 but the Federal Circuit had not considered the
collateral estoppel effect of claim interpretations until the RF
Delaware case.
District courts, such as TM Patents and Edberg, have suggested
that there is a special finality to a court's claim interpretation and that
collateral estoppel can apply to the claim interpretation even if there
is no final judgment on infringement or validity. 44 These courts
recommended that a decision need be "sufficiently firm"-not
absolutely final-for collateral estoppel to apply. 4 5  Other courts,
such as Kollmorgen, held that collateral estoppel could not apply to a
court's claim interpretation unless there was a decision on
infringement or validity, thus advocating a stricter standard of
138. See supra notes 2-3, 57, 75-86 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 75-81, 89 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 82-86, 90 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
144. See Edberg v. CPI-The Alternative Supplier, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Conn.
2001); TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D. N.Y. 1999).
145. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
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finality. 146 With its RF Delaware decision, the Federal Circuit was in
the position to clarify the level of finality necessary for collateral
estoppel to apply to a court's claim interpretation.
At first, the RF Delaware court appears to advocate a strict
standard for finality. The court states, "if the parties to a suit enter
into an extrajudicial settlement or compromise, there is no judgment,
and future litigation is not barred by. . . collateral estoppel .. .
Thus, the court implicitly rejects the holdings of TM Patents and
Edberg, which suggested a claim interpretation was sufficiently firm
for collateral estoppel to apply even when the parties settled prior to
trial, and instead adopts the Kollmorgen holding, which suggested
that it was not. The court goes on, however, to suggest, "[flor
purposes of issue preclusion..., 'final judgment' includes any prior
adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be
sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect."' 148 This kind of
reasoning is exactly what the TMPatents and Edberg courts relied on
for their suggestion that a court's claim interpretation has enough
finality for collateral estoppel to apply. 14 9 Thus, with this language
the court seems to adopt the reasoning in the TM Patents and Edberg
cases, advocating a less-strict standard for finality.
Though the court did not explicitly cite the TM
Patents/Kollmorgen split, and although it does not explicitly clarify
the standard for finality, its language clarifies to an extent the finality
required for collateral estoppel to apply. The court suggests that a
decision can have collateral estoppel effect even if there is no "final
judgment,"'150 therefore agreeing to an extent with the reasoning in
TM Patents and Edberg. By relying on eleventh circuit case law, the
court suggests that it is not necessary to reach absolute finality in
order for collateral estoppel to apply, but never suggests that a claim
interpretation alone meets the required level of finality, nor that
collateral estoppel can apply to a determination that is not
"sufficiently firm" so as to suggest that there is a special finality to a
court's claim interpretation.
146. Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469-70 (W.D. Va.
2001).
147. RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (quoting Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g and Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 542 (5th
Cir. 1978)).
148. Id. at 1261 (quoting Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 n.47 (1 th Cir. 2002)).
149. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
150. See RFDelaware, 326 F.3d at 1261.
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The RF Delaware court appears to adopt a standard for finality
somewhere in between the two extremes established by Kollmorgen,
at one end, and TM Patents and Edberg at the other. Although the
court does not go quite as far as the Kollmorgen court to suggest that
collateral estoppel can only apply to claim language after a final
determination of infringement or validity, it appears that in practice
that is what the RF Delaware holding requires. The court also rejects
the holdings in TM Patents and Edberg, and never suggests that a
court's claim interpretation has a special finality for collateral
estoppel purposes. Yet the RF Delware court follows the reasoning in
both cases that a determination does not have to lead to a final
judgment to have collateral estoppel effect.
In the lower court's RF Delaware decision, the court denied
summary judgment and granted-in-part and denied-in-part another
motion for summary judgment, but it also granted RFD's motion for
summary judgment of validity of the first claim. 151 The Federal
Circuit found that these determinations were not sufficiently firm for
collateral estoppel to apply to the claim interpretation.' 52 The court
also suggested that a mere settlement would not be a final judgment
for collateral estoppel to apply to the claim interpretation."'
Although the court's language suggests that a decision does not have
to be absolutely final for collateral estoppel to apply to the claim
interpretation, it did not apply collateral estoppel to a claim
interpretation when the court denied summary judgment and granted-
in-part and denied-in-part another motion for summary judgment.
Thus, the court appears to require a level of finality closer to what
Kollmorgen required, absolute finality, rather than what TM Patents
and Edberg suggested, where litigation "'has reached such a stage
that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated
again."154
It does not appear that the RF Delaware court adopted the
reasoning in TM Patents that the Markman decision implicitly
overruled pre-Markman Federal Circuit precedent on collateral
estoppel of claim interpretation.' 55 Prior to the Markman decision,
Federal Circuit precedent indicated that collateral estoppel could
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g and Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530,
542 (5th Cir. 1978)).
154. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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apply to determinations of infringement and validity as well as claim
interpretations if the required prongs of the collateral estoppel test
were met. 156  Pre-Markman Federal Circuit cases such as Pfaff v.
Wells Electronics, Jackson Jordan v. Plasser American, Molinaro v.
Fannon/Courier, and A.B. Dick v. Burroughs all support the
application of collateral estoppel to claim interpretation, but suggest
that there is no special finality to a claim interpretation. 57 Post-
Markman district courts, such as TM Patents and Edberg, suggested
that the Markman ruling overturned these cases, 158 while cases such
as Kollmorgen suggested that they are still good law. 59  The RF
Delaware court did not cite these pre-Markman cases on collateral
estoppel of claim interpretation or state that these decisions are still
good law, but it did not suggest that they were overruled, either.
Instead, the court's language indicates that the cases are still
precedent. The court held that collateral estoppel did not apply to the
claim interpretation because the grant-in-part and denial-in-part of
summary judgment and the settlement was not a sufficiently final
judgment in the previous case. 160 The court's holding indicates that
there is no special finality to a court's claim interpretation and
therefore is in line with the pre-Markman cases.
It appears that the RF Delaware case did not fully adopt the
reasoning in either TM Patents and Edberg nor that in Kollmorgen.
Based on the language of the case, however, it appears that the TM
Patents and Edberg decisions are incorrect, while the Kollmorgen
case was decided correctly-a claim interpretation itself is not
sufficiently final when the parties settle prior to trial. The RF
Delaware court suggests that there does not need to be an absolute
final judgment for collateral estoppel to apply, but implicitly rejects
the argument that a claim interpretation has a special finality.
156. See supra note 57.
157. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 5 F.3d 514, 518 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Jackson Jordan, Inc.
v. Plasser Amer. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Molinaro v. Fannon/Courier Corp., 745
F.2d 651, 655 (Fed. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp.,
265 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001); A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir.
1983); see also supra note 57.
158. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
160. RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
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D. The Form of the Claim Interpretation May Matter
Since the Markman decision, district courts have enjoyed wide
latitude in how and when to interpret patent claims. 61 Many courts
have Markman hearings, but these hearings have no specific structure
or form.' 62 A court may or may not allow the parties to engage in oral
argument; a court may or may not listen to witnesses; a court may or
may not entertain experts. 163 The court in RF Delaware suggests, in
dicta, that the form of a court's claim interpretation may affect the
collateral estoppel effect of the determination.
When the RF Delaware court states that a decision may have
collateral estoppel effect even though there is no final judgment, the
court relies on cases that suggest that a decision must merely be
"sufficiently firm" to have collateral estoppel effect. 64  The court
then suggests that for a decision to be "firm" and for collateral
estoppel to apply, the parties must have been "fully heard."'' 65 Then,
relying on the eleventh circuit case Christo, the court suggests that a
prior district court order that was issued after an evidentiary hearing
satisfied the "limited standard for finality" "because the district court
considered a wide range of evidence from all concerned parties,
notified the parties of possible preclusive effect, clearly considered
the findings final, and entered a final order approving the proposed
settlement."'
' 66
With this language, the court proposes that the form of the
Markman hearing might affect the application of collateral estoppel to
the claim interpretation.167  The court, by relying on Christo and
repeating the factors that Christo relied on, intimates that the form of
the hearing matters.168 Further, the court specifically differentiates its
facts from Christo: "Different from Christo, there is no evidence that
an evidentiary hearing was conducted to construe the claims of either
patent before the orders were issued." 169 Thus, the court suggests that
161. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
164. RF Delaware, 326 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339
n.47 (11 th Cir. 2002)).
165. Id. (citing Christo, 223 F.3d at 1339 n.47).
166. Id. (citing Christo, 223 F.3d at 1339).
167. Note that the TM Patents court also suggested that the form of the hearing may affect
the collateral estoppel effect of the claim interpretation. See TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72
F. Supp. 2d 370, 376 (S.D. N.Y. 1999); see also supra note 79 and accompanying text.
168. See RF Delaware, 326 F.3d at 1261-62.
169. Id. at 1262.
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the form of the Markman hearing matters. The court also points out
that RFD asserted that the Virginia district court did not entertain oral
argument on the claims of the '124 patent: "Thus, it is questionable
whether the parties were 'fully heard' before the Virginia district
court reached its decisions on claim constructions."' 
70
The court suggests that whether a judgment is final depends in
part on whether the parties were "fully heard."' 17' The court further
differentiates the Christo case by pointing out that the first court in
the RF Delaware case "did not put the parties on notice that the
orders could have preclusive effect."' 72 Again, this suggests that the
form of the Markman hearing, and whether the judge puts the parties
on notice about the preclusive effect of the claim interpretation, could
affect whether the claim interpretation has estoppel effect. The court
does not suggest which one of the elements it listed to determine if a
party is "fully heard" should be considered determinative. Although
the court does not actually rely on the form of the Markman hearing
or the "fully heard" prong in its holding, instead focusing on the
"final judgment" prong and the partial summary judgments, it appears
that the informal nature that Markman hearings can take might cause
the "final judgment" prong not to be met because the parties might
not be "fully heard."
The court's language indicates two things: (1) the form of the
hearing might affect whether the parties were fully heard and thus
whether collateral estoppel applies to the prior claim interpretation;
and (2) the second and third prongs of the collateral estoppel test may
be considered in the determination of whether the fourth prong was
met. The second prong of the test for collateral estoppel is that the
issue was litigated in the prior action; the third prong is that the party
against whom collateral estoppel is sought had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. 7 3 The court thus
appeared to be relying on these requirements to determine if the third
prong-"final judgment"--was met.
All of the court's language about the "fully heard" prong of
collateral estoppel appears to be dicta because the court based its
holding on the finality of the summary judgments.' 74 However, it did
consider some of these elements in determining whether there was a
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1261 (citing Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 n.47 (1 th Cir. 2002)).
172. Id. at 1262.
173. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
174. RFDelware, 326 F.3d at 1261.
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final judgment.' 75 Also, from this language it appears that the court
might consider the form of the Markman hearing when determining if
collateral estoppel should apply to a court's claim interpretation. If
the form of the claim interpretation hearing does not conform to what
a court considers necessary for a party to be "fully heard," then
collateral estoppel may not apply. Further, the form of the claim
interpretation could affect whether a party was "fully heard" and
whether a final judgment actually exists for collateral estoppel
purposes.
IV. CONCLUSION
In RF Delaware, the Federal Circuit held that collateral estoppel
did not apply to the earlier court's claim interpretation because the
orders granting partial summary judgment were not sufficiently final.
The court's decision is consistent with pre- and post-Markman
Federal Circuit precedent. Although the court held that collateral
estoppel did not apply to the earlier claim interpretation, its analysis
indicates that if all of the elements of collateral estoppel are met,
collateral estoppel can apply to claim constructions. Though the court
did not clearly state what level of finality is required for collateral
estoppel to apply, it implies that there is no special finality to a court's
claim interpretation, though an absolutely final judgment is not
necessary. Also, the court indicates (in dicta only) that whether a
party is "fully heard" for purposes of collateral estoppel might hinge
on the form of the court's claim construction.
Although the RF Delaware case is the first Federal Circuit
decision on collateral estoppel of claim interpretation since the
Supreme Court's Markman decision, the court did not clearly state
when collateral estoppel applies to an earlier court's claim
interpretation. The court also did not reference the current debate on
the issue. Based on the court's language, however, it appears that
claim interpretation does not have a special finality, as TM Patents
and Edberg held. The court also held, though, that collateral estoppel
can apply without an absolutely final decision, thus apparently
rejecting the finality requirement espoused in Kollmorgen. The
decision does not clearly end the debate on finality for collateral
estoppel of claim interpretation, but the court's reasoning and holding
should guide lower courts in their application of collateral estoppel to
claim interpretation.
175. Id. at 1261-62.

